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These effects and those ofaworldwide
recession on oil demand have created an
oversupply ofcrudeoiIthathas significantly
weakened OPEC's control over oil prices.
Despite cutbacks in production ofnearly 50
percent since 1981, the major OPEC
members have been unable to maintain
their benchmark priceof$34 per barrel.
Recently, OPEC was forced to cut its bench-
mark price by $5 per barrel (to $29), the first
price cut in the cartel's 22-year history.
WhetherOPEC will actually cease to be
effective in maintainingprices remains tobe
seen, but developments in the oil markets
since decontrol are strong testimony to the
economists' logicofmobilizingthe forces of
the marketplace to economize on a scarce
resource, stimulate supply, and undermine
anti-competitive supply cartelization.
Airlines...regulation
The regulatory distortions in the economic
environmentofthe the airline industry were
EPCA was due to expire in September 1981,
but President Reagan ended oil price
controls on January 1ofthat year although
the existing windfall profits tax remained.
The evidence from the post-decontrol
period supports the previously ignored
viewsofenergyeconomists. First, while U.S.
oil production in comparison to OPEC pro-
duction had fallen during the control years,
itbegan to rise rapidly after decontrol raised
producer prices. Second, since decontrol,
conservation efforts have produced an
economy that is 5 percent less energy-
intensive and a reduction in imports of
foreign oil by nearly one-third.
Such admonitions were largely ignored in
favorofmore politicallyexpedientcontrols
on the oil industry. The philosophy ofthe
EPAA was extended by the Energy Policy
and Conservation Actof 1975 (EPCA). That
Act was also designed to protect the public
from the effects ofrising oil prices.
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Economists are frequently criticizedfortheir
inabilityto forecast the effect ofchanges in
government fiscal and monetary policy, but
their good track record in predictingthe
effect ofmicroeconomic policy change is
often overlooked. In hindsight, economists
have been quite successful in prescribing
regulatory ormarket structure changes for
individual markets and these changes have
resulted in the more efficient use of
resources and in markets that serve the
consumer better. Yet economic theory and
public policy often remain at odds. Three
majorcases in point involve the petroleum,
airline, and trucking industries. In each,
economists had prescribed substantive
changes in government policy and quite
accuratelyanticipated the beneficial effects.
Petroleum
When the oil embargo by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
produced shortages and sharply increased
world petroleum prices in 1973, the result-
ing public outcry led U.S. policy makers on
a decade-long exercise to control energy
prices and supply allocations. Under Phase
IVofthe general wage and price control
legislation and the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), Congress
pegged the priceof"old"oil at its May 1973
level and allowed only "new," "released,"
and "stripper" oil to be sold at the higher
world price.
Economists at that time criticized the poli-
cies for their counterproductive effects on·
domestic demand and supply. They felt that
the artificially low prices would impede
conservation efforts and stifle domestic
production. In essence, the controls were
likelyto exacerbate the price and avail-
ability problems facing oil consumers.
Economic theory also argued that OPEC,
like all cartels, was inherently unstable, and
that allowing price competition would be
the fastest way to weaken OPEC's ability to
coordinate production and price.
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at least as comprehensive and certainly of
longerstanding than those in the oil indus-
try. The airline industry was first subjectto
majoreconomic regulation withthepassage
ofthe Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. The
Act empowered a federal Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA) to regulate interstate fares,
the numberofcertified carriers on each
interstate route, and the pattern of routes
served.
It became apparent to industrial economists
that the implementation ofthis regulatory
authority bythe CAA and its successor
agency the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
had created an inefficientairtransport
industry. First, by regulating fares to ensure
that the typical trunk-line carrier would be
able to meet its averuge costs, the CAB
reduced incentives for individual carriers to
contain costs. The regulated fares werecom-
puted by averaging operating costs ofall
carriers. Thus anyonecarrier couId rely on
subsequentadjustments to regulated fares to
compensate them for higher costs.
Second, since the regulations did notallow
airlines to compete on the basis ofprice,
they tried to compete in services offered (in
flight frequency, aircraft size and service
to remote communities). As a result, the
average load factor (proportion ofoccupied
seats) was very low, even on trunk routes.
Forexample, when carriers were scrambling
formarket share afterthe introductionofjets
in the 1960s, average load factors fell from
an alreadylow57 percentin 1967toonly47
percent in 1971.
Economists concluded that the regulated
interstate airline industry was generally
offering an inefficient combination ofhigh
fares and excess capacity. Empirical evi-
dence from the largely unregulated intra-
state California and Texas markets, where
rates were considerably lowerfor com-
parable distances and aircraftwere used
more intensively, backed them up. Indeed,
on routes where the regulated interstate car-
riers competed head-on with intrastate
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carriers, the interstate airlines routinely lost
moneyon routes thatwere veryprofitableto
moreefficient intrastate carriers. For exam-
ple, in 1970on the busy San Francisco-Los
Angeles corridor,PSA (an intrastate carrier)
was able to enjoy a high rate ofreturn while
larger interstate trunk carriers complained
that the route was not profitable.
...deregulation
Majorrelaxationofeconomic regu lationdid
notoccuruntil the Airline Deregulation Act
was passed in 1978. Today, airlinesare rela-
tively free to set fares and choose the routes
they wish to serve. There is aggressive dis-
counting on major routes, and fares have
fallen in comparison to costs even on an
industry-widebasis; although operating'
expenses rose by 77 percent between 1976
and 1980(largely because offuel costs),
average passenger revenues rose by only 51
percent in the same period. Aircraft use has
increased from load factors of48.5 percent
to 58.6 percent in the same period, as
competition forced airlines to use their
capacity more efficently.
Passengers on coast-to-coast trunk routes
have benefitted especially from price com-
petition, buttravelers on many smaller
routes areenjoying more benefits too. Con-
trary to the early predictions ofcritics of
deregulation, loss ofservice by major
carriers usually was replaced by service
from smaller commuter carriers. For exam-
ple, a recent survey of72 communities
wher,e majorcarriers had terminated serv-
ice, showed that fl ightfrequencies increased
by 30 percent between 1978 and 1981 due
to an increase in commuter carrier services.
A final testimony to the success ofderegu-
lation is thatfew carriers have pressed for
the return ofregulation despite the tough
recessionary conditions that coincided with
deregulation.
Trucking
'The,trucking industry, like the airline indus-
try, was regulated in response to concerns
about "destructive competition" duringthe.\l2L&.........&........a..:...I....J......I.-I-.L-L....
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The mostobviouseffectofthis relaxed regu-
lation was on rates. Although no simple
measure ofoverall rate levels is available,
the ICC found a strong downward trend in
rate filings afterderegulation. One large
carrier, for example, simply cut its rate 10
percent across the board. In addition, there
was a 322-percent increase in the numberof
newcarriers applyingforoperating author-
ity between 1980 and 1982. Further testify-
ing to the pro-competitive effects ofthe
MCA is the factthatcarriers' operatingrights
nowhavevirtuallynomarketvalue. Also, as
in the case ofthe airlineindustry, new, more
efficient carriers have stepped in to provide
comparable qualityservice on less popular
routes dropped by other carriers. A recent
ICC study 011,200 shippers in small com-
munitiesshowed thatthecommunities have
felt no adverse change in eitherthe avail-
ability or the quality ofservice.
Conclusion
The good record in the three industries
described does notmean that all ofmicro-
economic analysis leads to unambiguous
policy prescriptions; certain market struc-
tures (for example oligopoly) present chal-
lenges to economists in understanding the
behavioroffirms and in defining appro-
priate public policystrategies. Nevertheless,
the record suggests that we look again at
some ofthe more "radical" notions of
microeconomists currently being ignored,
such as educational vouchers to stimulate
competition and innovation in primary and
secondary education, and pricing (rather
than regu lation) ofpollution. But the atti-
tudes ofpolicy-makers are slowto change.
Even the beneficial effects ofthe deregula-
tion ofpetroleum prices have not changed
political opposition to deregulation of
natural gas prices. The record suggests that it
may be time to give economists and their
micropolicy recommendations theirdue.
Elaine Foppiano and Randall Pozdena
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Depression era. Regulation continued
because offears thatderegulation would
encourage the entry ofmany small carriers
into the industry, trigger uneconomic rate-
cutting and destabilize the industry.
The ICC instituted acomplexsystem ofoper-
ating authorities that controlled howcom-
modities couId be transported as well as the
types ofcustomers that couId beserved. Th is
detailed regulation caused inefficientutili-
zation ofcapacity. For example, some car-
riers were authorized to hauI less-than-
truckload (LTL) freight while others could
carry only full truckloads (TL). Because of
the difficuIty ofassembling two-way TL
service, many return hauls were made with
empty trucks. An ICC study found 35.4 per-
cent ofprivatecarriertruckcapacity milesto
be empty in 1976. Additional inefficiency
resu Ited from route patterns mandated by
the ICC that forced truckers to take indirect
routes that did notmatch traffic patterns.
These restrictions on entry and the regu la-
tion ofrates conferred large economic rents
on carriers with operating authority. The
American Trucking Association, for exam-
ple, estimated that priortoderegulation the
market value ofoperating rights (which •
could be bought and sold) was between 15
and 20 percent ofannual revenue for large
carriers, a reflection ofthe anticipated
excess profits to be enjoyed.
Reform finally came duringthe Carter
Administration with the MotorCarrierActof
1980 (MCA). The Act relaxed entry restric-
tions, greatly broadened the scope ofbusi-
ness for each class ofcarrier and gave
carriers flexibility in setting theirown rates.
Economists argued thatthe trucking industry
was a model ofperfect competition: the
industry had low barriers to entry and many
sellers offering similar services. They were,
therefore, critical ofthe authority given the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in
1935 by the MotorCarrierActto control
entry and set rates. .UOl3U!4SEM.4Eln • uo3oJO • EpEAoN • 04EPI
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 164,548 683 5,394 3.4
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 143,143 418 5,282 3.8
Commercial and industrial 44,979 222 2,216 5.2
Real estate 57,076 19 - 13 - 0.0
Loans to individuals 23,609 90 282 1.2
Securities loans 3,044 - 152 904 4202
U.s. Treasury securities* 8,127 - 93 1,762 27.7
Other securities'*' 13,278 358 - 1,650 - 11.1
Demand deposits - total# 41,529 - 385 1,968 - 5.0
Demand deposits - adjusted 28,883 - 335 763 2.7
Savings deposits - totaH 66,034 - 395 34,656 110.4
Time deposits - total# 66,880 - 277 - 23,848 - 26.3
lndividu<;lls, part. & corp. 59,902 - 62 - 21,489 - 26.4
(Large negotiable CD's) 20,182 - 452 12865 38.9
Weekly Averages
ofDaily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Oeficiency (-)
Borrowings















* f;xcludes trading accountsecurities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Gregory"Tong) orto theauthor..•.Free copies
ofthis and other Federal Reserve publicatiQns can be obtained by calling orwriting the Public
Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974·2246.